


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U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090  
Washington, DC 20529 - 2090

U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services



FILE: MSC-06-026-12826

Office: LOS ANGELES

Date: SEP 30 2009

IN RE: Applicant:



APPLICATION: Application for Status as a Temporary Resident pursuant to Section 245A of the  
Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. If your appeal was dismissed or rejected, all documents have been returned to the National Benefits Center. You no longer have a case pending before this office, and you are not entitled to file a motion to reopen or reconsider your case. If your appeal was sustained or remanded for further action, you will be contacted.

John F. Grissom  
Acting Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The application for temporary resident status pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreements reached in *Catholic Social Services, Inc., et al., v. Ridge, et al.*, CIV. NO. S-86-1343-LKK (E.D. Cal) January 23, 2004, and *Felicity Mary Newman, et al., v. United States Immigration and Citizenship Services, et al.*, CIV. NO. 87-4757-WDK (C.D. Cal) February 17, 2004 (CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements), was denied by the Director, Los Angeles. The decision is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant submitted a Form I-687, Application for Status as a Temporary Resident under Section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act), and a Form I-687 Supplement, CSS/Newman Class Membership Worksheet. The director denied the application, finding that the applicant had not established by a preponderance of the evidence that he had continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status for the duration of the requisite period.

On appeal, the applicant, through counsel, asserts that he has established his unlawful residence for the requisite time period.

An applicant for temporary resident status must establish entry into the United States before January 1, 1982, and continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through the date the application is filed. Section 245A(a)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2). The applicant must also establish that he or she has been continuously physically present in the United States since November 6, 1986. Section 245A(a)(3) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(3). The regulations clarify that the applicant must have been physically present in the United States from November 6, 1986 until the date of filing the application. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b).

For purposes of establishing residence and physical presence under the CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements, the term “until the date of filing” in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b) means until the date the applicant attempted to file a completed Form I-687 application and fee or was caused not to timely file during the original legalization application period of May 5, 1987 to May 4, 1988. CSS Settlement Agreement paragraph 11 at page 6; Newman Settlement Agreement paragraph 11 at page 10.

The applicant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite periods, is admissible to the United States under the provisions of section 245A of the Act, and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status. The inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5).

Although the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3) provides an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit in support of his or her claim of continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since prior to January 1, 1982, the submission of any other relevant document is permitted pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L). To meet his or her burden of proof, an applicant must provide evidence of eligibility apart from the applicant’s own

testimony, and the sufficiency of all evidence produced by the applicant will be judged according to its probative value and credibility. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(6).

The "preponderance of the evidence" standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is "probably true," where the determination of "truth" is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that "[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality." *Id.* Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(6). The weight to be given any affidavit depends on the totality of the circumstances, and a number of factors must be considered. More weight will be given to an affidavit in which the affiant indicates personal knowledge of the applicant's whereabouts during the time period in question rather than a fill-in-the-blank affidavit that provides generic information. The regulations provide specific guidance on the sufficiency of documentation when proving residence through evidence of past employment or attestations by churches or other organizations. 8 C.F.R. §§ 245a.2(d)(3)(i) and (v).

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the applicant submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is "probably true" or "more likely than not," the applicant or petitioner has satisfied the standard of proof. *See U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (defining "more likely than not" as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application or petition.

The issue in this proceeding is whether the applicant (1) entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and (2) has continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status for the requisite period of time. The documentation that the applicant submits in support of his claim to have arrived in the United States before January 1982 and lived in continuous unlawful status during the requisite period consists of affidavits, letters, and other documents. Some of the evidence submitted indicates that the applicant resided in the United States after May 4, 1988; however, because evidence of residence after May 4, 1988 is not probative of residence during the requisite time period, it shall not be discussed.

The letters from [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] and the affidavits from [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] all contain statements that the affiants have known the applicant for years and that attest to the applicant being physically present in the United States during all or part of the required period. These affiants fail, however, to establish the applicant's continuous unlawful residence in the United States for the duration of the requisite period. As stated previously, the evidence must be evaluated not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality; an applicant must provide evidence of eligibility apart from his or her own testimony; and the sufficiency of all evidence produced by the applicant will be judged according to its probative value and credibility.

The AAO notes that in his affidavit dated June 10, 2004, [REDACTED] states that he first met the applicant in the summer of 1982 while he was working for [REDACTED]. Mr. [REDACTED] states that the applicant maintained [REDACTED] lawn every month and that he saw the applicant often until the applicant stopped working for [REDACTED] in 2003. Mr. [REDACTED] affidavit indicates that the applicant worked for [REDACTED] from 1982 to 2003. Mr. [REDACTED] does not mention that the applicant left California in 1984 for several years.

None of the witness statements provide concrete information, specific to the applicant and generated by the asserted associations with him, which would reflect and corroborate the extent of those associations and demonstrate that they were a sufficient basis for reliable knowledge about the applicant's residence during the time addressed in the affidavits. To be considered probative and credible, witness affidavits must do more than simply state that an affiant knows an applicant and that the applicant has lived in the United States for a specific time period. Their content must include sufficient detail from a claimed relationship to indicate that the relationship probably did exist and that the witness does, by virtue of that relationship, have knowledge of the facts alleged. Upon review, the AAO finds that, individually and together, the witness statements do not indicate that their assertions are probably true. Therefore, they have little probative value.

The record of proceeding also contains copies of postmarked envelopes dated December 7, 1984 and February 21, 1985. The AAO notes that the envelope postmarked 1984 contains an address for the applicant that is not listed in the Form I-687.

The record of proceeding also contains a statement for the applicant dated August 15, 1982. Although the statement includes the applicant's name, the Form I-687 indicates that the applicant lived at the address on the statement beginning in 1989.

There is no explanation of record for any of the noted inconsistencies. It is incumbent upon the applicant to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. Doubt cast on any aspect of the applicant's proof may lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the application. *See Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988).

The record of proceeding contains a copy of an airline ticket issued on December 1, 1987 and an airline boarding pass stub listing the applicant's last name and stamped Chicago December 10, 1987. The board pass stub is some evidence that the applicant was in the United States in December 1987.

The remaining evidence in the record is comprised of the applicant's statements and application forms, in which he claims to have entered the United States in December 1981. As noted by the director, the record of proceeding contains inconsistent information regarding the applicant's first entry into the United States. The record contains interview notes indicating that the applicant stated under oath that he first entered the United States in May or July of 1981. In addition, the AAO notes that the Form I-687 signed by the applicant on September 1, 1993, does not list that he was

employed in Illinois as a machine operator from 1985 to 1987 as listed in the Form I-687 filed on October 26, 2005. As stated previously, doubt cast on any aspect of the applicant's proof may lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the application. *See Matter of Ho, supra*. The applicant has not submitted any additional evidence in support of his claim that he was physically present or had continuous residence in the United States during the entire requisite period or that he entered the United States in 1981.

On appeal, counsel did not address the director's concerns regarding inconsistencies in the record of proceeding. Upon a *de novo* review of all of the evidence in the record, the AAO agrees with the director that the evidence submitted by the applicant has not established that he is eligible for the benefit sought.

On appeal, counsel argues that the applicant did not receive a notice of intent to deny (NOID) prior to the director's denial and that therefore; the applicant was denied class membership. The director, based on the applicant's class membership, adjudicated the application for temporary residence on the merits. As the director did not deny the applicant the benefit of class membership, the director was not required to issue a notice of intent to deny prior to issuing the final decision in this case.

Although counsel argues that the applicant's rights to procedural due process were violated, the applicant has not shown that any violation of the regulations resulted in "substantial prejudice" to him. *See De Zavala v. Ashcroft*, 385 F.3d 879, 883 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that an alien "must make an initial showing of substantial prejudice" to prevail on a due process challenge). The applicant has fallen far short of meeting this standard. A review of the record and the adverse decision indicates that the director properly applied the statute and regulations to the applicant's case. The applicant's primary complaint is that the director denied the application. As previously discussed, the applicant has not met his burden of proof and the denial was the proper result under the regulation. Accordingly, the applicant's claim is without merit.

Therefore, based upon the foregoing, the applicant has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and continuously resided in an unlawful status in the United States for the requisite period as required under both 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5) and *Matter of E- M--*, *supra*. The applicant is, therefore, ineligible for temporary resident status under section 245A of the Act on this basis.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed. This decision constitutes a final notice of ineligibility.